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I. INTRODUCTION
HE past decade has witnessed an historic rejection of state control
of markets in eastern Europe.1 Expansion of domestic antitrust
immunity policy toward municipal businesses based upon federal-
*Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; J.D. Harvard, 1972.
1. As one commentator has stated,
Recognition of the need to establish antitrust policy as the sine qua non ...
of a democratic society's economic policy is being reaffirmed by nations
newly emerging from a Marxist tradition.... Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and
the former Czechoslovakia have all recently adopted antitrust laws in recog-
nition of the necessary connection between establishing a private enterprise-
based economy and the need to protect the economic liberty of the state,
people and businesses in that economy. ...
John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and Health Care Reform, 39 AN'rRUST BULL. 59, 65 n.12(1994) (citations omitted). See also Irving Howe, Introduction to MICHAEL HARRINGTON,
SOCIALISM: PAST AND FUTURE xiv (1990).
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ism concerns,2 however, which occurred during the same period, has fos-
tered autonomous governmental control of markets. The judicial
application of the Parker doctrine to local government has tended to con-
tradict the premise underlying several generations of U.S. foreign policy
designed to support emerging competitive market economies outside the
country. 3 Academic analysis of the Parker doctrine during the 1980s was
heated and creative. A number of commentators, with varying view-
points, have addressed the bases for and appropriateness of municipal
antitrust immunity.4 This article, after summarizing the currently ambig-
2. The Supreme Court created and applied the so-called "State-Action" immunity
doctrine in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Court refused to affirm
antitrust liability with respect to a state-imposed agreement to limit output and supply of
raisins in California because "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
... suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature." Id. at 350-51. "The Supreme Court in Parker thus first articu-
lated the state action immunity doctrine after consulting the text and history of the Sher-
man Act." Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260, 1265 n.7
(3d Cir. 1994).
Thirty-three years after Parker, the Court clarified that state-action antitrust immunity
did not apply to private persons whose conduct was merely authorized by a state agency.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976). Similarly, Parker immunity did not
apply to proprietary business conduct by a municipal government participating in the mar-
ketplace merely because the state had authorized the municipality to become a market
participant. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978).
The Court clarified that municipal immunity existed only when the municipality acted
"pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public ser-
vice." 435 U.S. at 413. The Court affirmed Lafayette in Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), and found no antitrust immunity for home rule
based regulation of cable television by the municipal dependant. The Court affirmed Can-
tor in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980),
and required persons claiming Parker immunity to satisfy a two-pronged test: "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." 445 U.S. at 105
(quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
Thereafter, as will be addressed below, the courts dramatically liberalized the Parker
doctrine until the Supreme Court's most recent Parker analysis in FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.
Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) reversed that trend. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
In particular, and a focus of this article, the Court in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,
471 U.S. 34 (1985), held that a municipality is entitled to Parker immunity if it meets only
the "clear articulation" prong of Midcal, even in the absence of active state supervision.
Id. at 47.
3. See, e.g., Ferdinand Protzman, Privatization in the East is Wearing to Germans,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at DI. In Ticor, the Supreme Court emphasized its earlier
recognition in Lafayette of the contradiction between an antitrust-policed free market on
one hand, and markets controlled by government-owned or regulated business on the
other hand:
The preservation of the free market and of a system of free enterprise with-
out price fixing or cartels is essential to economic freedom. A national policy
of such a pervasive and fundamental character is an essential part of the eco-
nomic and legal system within which the separate States administer their own
laws for the protection and advancement of their people. Continued en-
forcement of the national antitrust policy grants the States more freedom,
not less, in deciding whether to subject discrete parts of the economy to addi-
tional regulations and controls.
Ticor, 504 U.S. at 632 (citation omitted).
4. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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uous state of the caselaw5 and reconsidering prior characterizations of
Supreme Court doctrine, will attempt to synthesize those views. The arti-
cle will argue that the balancing of federalism and free market concerns
as first addressed in Lafayette, modified in Midcal, and confirmed in
Ticor, constitutes the best policy toward municipal market participant
conduct and the only practical alternative to the privatization of munici-
pally-owned business. In light of legislated damages immunity, Hallie
should be reversed to limit municipal market participant antitrust immu-
nity to those situations in which the state not only authorizes proprietary
municipal conduct which would displace competition, but also acts in its
sovereign capacity, through the creation of public utility or similar con-
trol, to actively supervise non-competitive municipal business practices. 6
5. The ambiguity has been created by Ticor's apparent reiteration of the "clear artic-
ulation" requirement from Midcal, as contrasted with a mere "foreseeability" interpreta-
tion of Midcal's first prong in some lower courts. See, e.g., FTC v. Hospital Rd. of
Directors, 38 F.3d 1184, 1190-91 (11th Cir. 1994) (Lee County). The Court's implied dis-
tinction in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) be-
tween municipal regulation on one hand, and market participation on the other, has added
to the confusion. For example, the refusal by the court in Lee County to respond to the
FTC's effort to apply the language in Ticor and City of Columbia to the case before it is
puzzling at best. The Court apparently requires a "clear articulation" of state policy to
displace competition before affording immunity to municipal market participant conduct.
6. In other words, this article proposes that municipal market participant conduct be
treated the same as private market participant conduct for purposes of applying the Parker
doctrine, as recently interpreted in Ticor. As the Second Circuit held in Hertz Corp. v.
City of New York, 1 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1054 (1994), "a
municipality may benefit from the 'state action' exemption only if it has acted pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy," rejecting a mere state "foreseeability" test for municipal
Parker immunity in light of Ticor. See also Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931,
948 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994) (holding that for Parker state
action immunity to apply as a limitation on antitrust liability, the alleged anticompetitive
acts "must be taken in the state's 'sovereign capacity', and not as a market participant in
competition with commercial enterprise."). Hertz and Genentech reflect the need, first,
for a clear articulation of state policy to displace competition, and second, the need for
stricter scrutiny for market participant conduct. Neither decision directly challenges the
Hallie rule that municipalities participating in the market do not need to prove active state
supervision of their conduct to obtain antitrust immunity. This article does. This article
challenges, for example, the Eleventh Circuit position that, not only does state legislation
that merely foresees that local governments will act anticompetitively suffice to confer
Parker immunity, but also that "there is no meaningful distinction for purposes of immu-
nity between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' activities." Askew v. DCH Regional Health
Care Auth., 995 F.2d 1033, 1039 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 603 (1993) (citing Mc-
Callum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649, 653 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992)). The distinction advo-
cated in McCallum was not "governmental/proprietary" but rather "regulatory/market
participant." See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
The irony and irrationality of supporting free market capitalism as a national economic
and foreign trade and foreign diplomatic policy, on one hand, yet protecting local state
monopoly and command economies in the name of authoritarian federalism, on the other
hand, is explored generally in Richard M. Steuer, Getting it Backward on Antitrust, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at F13, and Michael E. Porter, Japan Isn't Playing by Different Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at F13.
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II. FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY AND MUNICIPAL
BUSINESS: AN OVERVIEW
Municipal governments regularly choose between demands of em-
ployee organizations and the less affluent to increase or maintain the pro-
vision of services and goods by government and the conflicting demands
of wealthier taxpayers and private business to privatize or otherwise de-
fer to the private sector.7 These choices occur within the broader context
of federal and state unfunded mandates to local government to provide
municipal services, combined with disappearing revenue sources. More
fundamentally, these choices implicate the core competitive market/in-
dustrial policy/command economy debate.8
Reinforced in part by the so-called "market participant" exception to
the dormant Commerce Clause, 9 which has eliminated potential Com-
merce Clause challenges to the proprietary business conduct of state and
7. The issue of "privatization" of services now provided by government arises in both
the national and local governmental context. The debate contains political as well as eco-
nomic elements, and its resolution is far from obvious. See, e.g., Ferdinand Protzman,
Privatization in the East Is Wearing to Germans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at D1:
[T]he controversy over [the] economic transformation [in East Germany] ...
continue[s] to rage, with some Germans complaining of the financial cost of
the privatization and others saying that the human toll - high unemploy-
ment and economic upheaval - has been too great to be acceptable...
'There were people ... who knew all about market economics .... [B]ut no
one knew how to transform an economy from socialist central planning to a
free market. There was no road map.'
Id.
8. See HARRINGTON, supra note 1. When the privatization debate occurs at the mu-
nicipal level, and the debate incorporates whether antitrust policing is necessary for non-
privatized municipal business, the fundamental political consequences of authorizing a lo-
cal command economy are frequently overlooked by the courts and commentators, who
focus either on a cost-benefit analysis or federalist deference to local government decision-
making. See Thomas McArdle, New Broom in New York City? Giuliani Has Cut Spend-
ing, Is Mulling Privatizing, INVEsTOR's Bus. DAILY, June 6, 1994, at 1:
'New York is actually one of America's laggards when it comes to privatiza-
tion ... countless other U.S. cities, large and small, have already committed
themselves to extensive privatization, generally with good results in cost sav-
ings and service improvement' ... The privatization of hospitals and other
social services could be the biggest battle against the City Council.
Id at 2. The anticompetitive conduct of a private service provider, of course, is not entitled
to Parker immunity in the absence of active state supervision, under Midcal.
9. See generally GSW, Inc. v Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1993)
(discussing application of the dormant Commerce Clause):
At its most basic level, the dormant Commerce Clause stands for the princi-
ple "'that the right to engage in interstate commerce is not the gift of a state,
and that a state cannot regulate or restrain it .... " ' The Supreme Court,
however, has developed an exception to the broad reach of the dormant
Commerce Clause to address situations where a state is acting as a partici-
pant in the market, rather than as a regulator.
Id at 1511 (citation omitted).
Thus, the Court has recognized the distinction (and its constitutional significance) be-
tween regulatory conduct and market participant conduct by government. While local gov-
ernment is free under the Commerce Clause to participate in the market like a private
actor, its conduct should be subject to the same competitive rules as that of private actors,




local government,' 0 and by expanded legislative 1 and judicial12 immuni-
zation of municipal conduct from federal antitrust challenge, municipali-
ties frequently have adopted a compromise policy: they are increasing
municipally-owned business activities but, where economically and politi-
cally feasible, are doing so on a profit-making basis, and commonly are
exerting law-making power to exclude competitive challenges. 13 Not only
does reliance upon monopoly market participant ventures by government
reduce the specific fiscal and availability concerns regarding particular
services, monopoly profits frequently provide a politically preferable al-
ternative to taxes as a general revenue source. 14
The massive lobbying response by local government to the City of
Boulder decision, together with a change in political control following the
1980 election, resulted in a crucial policy reaction by the three branches
of the federal government.' 5 This reaction has begun to cause significant
interference with the preeminent national economic goals of uniformity
and free markets. 16 In particular, the twin holdings of Hallie, confirming
that municipal antitrust immunity requires only state contemplation, not
clear articulation or specific authorization, of the displacement of compe-
tition, and eliminating the requirement found in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 17 that anticompetitive conduct by
10. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1983) (upholding city-funded discrimination in construction employment under the mar-
ket participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause). But see C & A Carbone v.
Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1684 (1994) (holding that the dormant Commerce
Clause does not permit local government to "hoard a local resource"); Oregon Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1355 (1994) (striking down Oregon's impo-
sition of an extra dumping fee for out-of-state waste). In these latter two Commerce
Clause cases, as well as in Ticor, the Court has signalled its awareness of the importance of
eliminating undue governmental interference in or control over the marketplace.
11. In response to Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40
(1982), Congress immunized municipalities from antitrust damages actions but not from
antitrust actions seeking injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 26 or attorneys fees under Lo-
cal Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988).
12. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 499 U.S. 365 (1991);
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Lee County, 38 F.3d 1184 (11th
Cir. 1994).
13. See, e.g., McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992), and discussion
infra at notes 132-37 and accompanying text. The City of Athens, Georgia earned an aver-
age profit of $2,000,000 per year from the sale of water to non-residents for a price double
that paid by residents.
14. For an interesting outgrowth of local governmental monopoly, see Martin Tolchin,
13 Cities Accused of Diverting Airport Money: Congressman Sees Revenue Being Illegally
Diverted to Pay for Local Needs, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 3, 1994, at A17: "Some [municipally
operated] airports are financially successful while the cities that own them may well experi-
ence critical financial problems .... This creates a condition where political leaders view
their successful airports as cash cows." Id.
15. The Supreme Court responded with Hallie and City of Columbia. Congress re-
sponded with the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. The Executive Branch sup-
ported each of these changes. ,
16. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 620, 621 (1992). See also infra note 34
(quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978)).
17. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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municipalities be actively supervised by the state to receive immunity,18
have provided inadequate guidance to municipal officials and may no
longer be supported by a majority of the Supreme Court. The Court in
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,19 left tantalizingly open
its understanding that municipal market participant 20 conduct may be
treated deferentially for antitrust immunity purposes.21 Moreover, subse-
quent to City of Columbia, in its most recent treatment of state action
immunity, the Court (including Justice Scalia, specially concurring) recog-
nized the continuing vitality of the core concerns expressed in Lafayette,22
and appeared to distance itself from lower court interpretations of Hal-
lie.23 Even more recently, the Court condemned anticompetitive conduct
by local governments in the context of Commerce Clause challenges. 24
As will be described in the next section, a re-examination of the
Supreme Court's wavering path in applying Parker antitrust immunity to
municipalities demonstrates an unfortunate judicial lapse in deferring to a
one-dimensional concept of conservative economic policy.25
III. RECONSIDERING THE SUPREME COURT'S FREE
MARKET/FEDERALISM PENDULUM
As introduced above, the question of whether and to what extent mu-
nicipalities would be subject to federal antitrust laws was initially ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in the late 1970s when a municipal electric
utility company brought suit against a private electric utility.26 Having
initiated antitrust claims, the city became the subject of a counterclaim
alleging, among other things, attempted monopolization, exclusion of
competition through the use of long-term supply contracts, and tying
electrical service to continued water and gas service.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Lafayette gained a majority only for its
first section. However, this first section explicates certain fundamental
18. See supra note 2 (discussing the evolution of the "State-Action" immunity
doctrine).
19. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
20. As used in this article, the term "market participant" refers to those situations in
which a local government both owns and operates a product or service-providing business
and does so on a fee-for-service basis, participating in a seller-purchaser market.
21. See City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 365.
22. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 389.
23. See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 621.
24. See Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1677; Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl.
Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
25. In a recent decision, the district court for the Southern District of Texas indicated,
perhaps, the beginning of the return of the pendulum in the lower courts. In response to a
challenge to a municipal ordinance limiting private jitney service, the court held that the
city was not immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine because the
municipality engaged in unreasonable and arbitrary regulations in a manner that was not
consistent with state policy. The court also struck down the ordinance as a Commerce
Clause violation, thereby expressly recognizing the relationship between such recent
Supreme Court decisions and policy as Carbone and Ticor. See Santos v. City of Houston,
852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
26. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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constitutional values that have resurfaced recently in Ticor. The decision
begins with the premise that the Sherman Act 27 is comprehensive in its
scope and "'shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within the Act
every person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or mo-
nopolize commercial intercourse among the states.'"28 Two counterbal-
ancing policies are identified by the majority as allowing an activity or an
entity to escape from the scope of the Act: first, open communication
between the people and their government 29 and second, federalism. 30
It is the second policy, federalism, from which the state action doctrine
has blossomed. The Constitution as a whole structurally provides that the
federal government has certain enumerated powers while all other pow-
ers are left to the states.31 In Lafayette, the majority is concerned that,
should municipalities become economically autonomous, there would be
over 60,000 local units each going in its own direction without regard to
the aggregate effects on the national economy, thereby creating "a seri-
ous chink in the armor of antitrust protection" which Congress has care-
fully provided in the form of national legislation. 32 "In enacting the
Sherman Act... Congress mandated competition as the polestar by which
all must be guided in ordering their business affairs. ' 33 When municipali-
ties, on their own and without continuing control and supervision by the
state, decide to enter and control the marketplace, two general outcomes
are likely. First, conflicting local rules and policies interfere with na-
tional attempts to produce a uniform regulatory system.34 For instance, if
each community within the United States enacted laws concerning, or
27. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
28. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 398 (quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)). The Court noted that previous decisions had settled that
municipalities are "persons" subject to the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159 (1942); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906).
29. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
137-38 (1961). This concept includes the first amendment right to petition. Id. See also
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965).
30. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker Court recognized that the Sher-
man Act was meant to apply only to business combinations. The states, as sovereigns
themselves, have the authority to enact anti-competitive legislation for their own ends.
Parker noted the distinction, however, between a state's legislative action as sovereign and
the state's authorization to private parties to violate antitrust laws, Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904), or by joining in a private agreement, cf.
Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941). Where the state enacts governmen-
tal policy, the activity is that of a sovereign and therefore beyond the scope of federal
antitrust laws; it is where the state acts otherwise that it may run afoul of the federal regu-
lations. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52.
31. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 5 (2d ed. 1988).
32. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 407-08.
33. Id. at 406.
34. Id. at 408. As the Court notes:
When these bodies [i.e., municipalities] act as owners and providers of serv-
ices, they are fully capable of aggrandizing other economic units with which
they interrelate, with the potential of serious distortion of the rational and
efficient allocation of resources, and the efficiency of free markets which the
regime of competition embodied in the antitrust laws is thought to engender.
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participated in the sale of, bottled water, such that a continuum existed,
from the complete ban of competitive private sales or strict regulation on
labeling and prices to laissez faire, the end result would likely be a cha-
otic, inefficient allocation of supply across the nation. The result would
be related to the motivating factors behind the municipal laws and not
based upon the desires and demands of the consumers for bottled water.
The second possible result, related to the lack of uniformity and effi-
cient allocation, is the undermining effect some of these divergent policies
would inevitably have upon operation of the free market system itself
extending beyond the particular product and geographic markets at issue.
In the course of regulating or entering a market, a municipality may de-
cide it is the most efficient or fairest provider of goods to its people. To
this end, the municipality may decide to become the sole supplier of bot-
tled water, to follow through with the above example, and regulate its
competitors out of business 35 or otherwise engage in exclusionary con-
duct derived from its de jure status. 36 The end result would be state or
municipal ownership of what, as a matter of national policy, should be a
private means of production.3 7 These pockets of socialism could not eas-
ily restrain their anticompetitive effects to particular localities. 38
Having recognized the inherent dangers involved in proprietary munic-
ipal companies, the Lafayette Court concluded that municipalities cannot
automatically be immunized from antitrust liability. The Court held that,
in the case of municipal market participant conduct, courts must perform
a Parker analysis to determine the extent of antitrust immunity for these
political subdivisions of the state.39 As the majority recognizes, in per-
haps the most controversial part of the decision,
the economic choices made by public corporations in the conduct of
their business affairs, designed as they are to assure maximum bene-
fits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to
comport with the broader interests of national economic well-being
than are those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the
interests of the organization and its shareholders. 40
35. This has happened in Colorado with a shuttle service. See infra notes 138-42 and
accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992).
37. See JAMES A. CAPORASO AND DAVID P. LEVINE, THEORIES OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY 55-57 (1992).
38. See supra notes 6-8.
39. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408.
40. Id. at 403. The Court drew an interesting parallel between a corporation and a
municipality finding three common factors: (1) both entities are answerable to some third
party (shareholders or residents); (2) both must keep the third party happy or else the
people running the municipality/corporation will lose their job (losing at the next election,
vote of no confidence, proxy fights, LBOs, etc.); and (3) both can and do enter the market-
place to buy and sell products and/or services. In Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313
U.S. 450 (1941) Kansas City officials entered into an agreement to provide certain conces-
sions and free rents to dealers who would move from Missouri to Kansas, where the city
was developing a new market. These incentives went beyond the costs the dealers would
incur in such a move. A suit was brought under the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Elkins Act, which prohibited certain actions from being taken with respect to the transpor-
1790 [Vol. 48
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Although Justice Brennan's opinion only gathered a plurality, the
Court, using the Parker doctrine 4' as a basis, concluded that a municipal-
ity would be exempt under Parker only with respect to "anticompetitive
conduct... pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regula-
tion or monopoly public service." 42 In hindsight, perhaps the most practi-
cally significant aspect of the holding was the observation that the
municipality need not point to an express state legislative mandate for
each anticompetitive act in question to receive immunity; rather, it is suf-
ficient to find, from the state's grant of authority to conduct such opera-
tions, "'that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained
of.' "43 Thus, federalism concerns caused an expansion of Tenth Amend-
ment immunity from the states to their subdivision merely by virtue of
legislated "contemplation" of the displacement of competition. The plu-
rality thus reinforced a troublesome view that the Tenth Amendment
might trump the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses with respect to local
economic regulatory policy.
Five years later, the Court revisited the state action doctrine in Com-
munity Communications v. City of Boulder." The city government, in
response to the development of new technologies in the television signal
delivery system market, placed a hold on the plaintiff's request to expand
its cable television business in the city. The plaintiff had a revocable,
non-exclusive license to conduct his cable business at the time, but the
city was concerned that by allowing it to expand before the city was able
to analyze its options the city would preclude competitors from entering
the market later. Community Communications felt this moratorium con-
stituted a section 1 Sherman Act violation and filed suit to enjoin the
city's restriction.45
What distinguished this case from Lafayette is the existence of a home
rule clause in the state constitution of Colorado. This clause empowers
cities and towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants, including Boulder, to
alter their municipal charter, which, like a private corporate charter, con-
tains the requisite state authorization to engage in specified activities.
Additionally, the principal charter trumps any law of the state with which
it conflicted, provided the issue in conflict was solely one of local concern.
tation of property by railroad in interstate commerce. The city was authorized by the state
to make disbursements or concessions "in such amounts as its . . . governing body may
determine" for those purposes which the governing body believed to be in the best inter-
ests of the city. 313 U.S. at 468. However, the concessions made by the city here were
found not only to be in contravention of federal law, but also contrary to the best interests
of the city. 313 U.S. at 467-74. In Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lily & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994) the court using Union Pacific concluded Parker
policies do not extend to a state acting as a commercial participant. See id. at 938-49.
41. The Lafayette plurality would like to strictly construe the exemption to ensure
there is no problem of 60,000 local units going in different directions.
42. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413.
43. Id at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431,
434 (1976), aff'd, 435 U.S. 389 (1978)).
44. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
45. Id. at 44-47.
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In other words, the state of Colorado gives municipalities self-defining,
self-government for all local matters.46 The Court recognized that, under
Lafayette, the city's action regulating cable television by restricting plain-
tiff's expansion could be immune only if it fell into one of two categories:
if it were (1) an action of the state, under Parker, or (2) an action of a
municipality pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy."'47
As in Lafayette, the Boulder Court was concerned with balancing fed-
eralism and free market interests and explicitly stated that the American
system of government "has no place for sovereign cities."'48 Relying also
46. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
47. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54 (citing 435 U.S. at 413).
48. Id. at 53. It has been noted that the decision not to treat cities as equivalent to
states for federal antitrust purposes is debatable because cities are treated equal to states in
other areas of the law. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Effi-
ciency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 502 (1987) (citing National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (municipalities treated the same as states for 10th
amendment purposes), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.,
411 U.S. 624 (1973) (municipalities and states treated the same under the supremacy
clause); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (municipalities and states treated
the same under the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974) (municipalities and states not treated the same under
the Eleventh Amendment)). The mere fact that cities are treated as equal to states in one
area of law is, however, not support for them being treated the same in other areas. One
should look instead at the underlying policies of the laws in question and what they mean.
Lafayette and Boulder both say the U.S. system of government has no place for sovereign
cities. The Parker doctrine is primarily based on sovereignty. See cases cited supra note 2.
The courts are attempting to determine if municipalities should be shielded for the same
reason. If municipalities are sovereign, then they need not have separate authorization by
the state in order to be protected by Parker. If municipalities are not sovereign, then the
only way to be protected by Parker is to have their acts authorized by the states, thus
gaining protection through the sovereignty of the state. At the surface level, municipalities
are not sovereign because the Constitution contains no mention of them. All power is
divided between the federal government and the states. This point is relied upon by Lafay-
ette as a basis for its conclusion. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 400, 412. At a more fundamental
level, however, to recognize municipalities as sovereign would be to create a city-state
system in America-in essence creating a multitude of small societies founded in some
sense upon a democratic foundation. But, as Madison stated, it is the sovereign, small
society that
can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or
interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a com-
munication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there
is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an ob-
noxious individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever been spec-
tacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with
personal security, or the rights of property. ...
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 30 (James Madison) (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds.,
1989).
Madison was of course writing about pure democracies, a form of government that can
only survive on a small scale. Madison's answer was to form a republican government, but
even a republican form of government "must be raised to [represent] a certain number, in
order to guard against the cabals of the few ... d. Thus, our republican form of govern-




on United States v. Kagama,49 the Court noted that cities may have lim-
ited legislative functions, but such functions are derived solely from the
state.5
0
When addressing the question of whether the Colorado legislature had
contemplated the anticompetitive acts involved here, the Court recog-
nized that the state had taken a stance of pure neutrality on the subject,
reportedly delegating state legislative policy-making authority to local
governments. The Court adopted the Court of Appeals' characterization
that "[w]e are here concerned with City action in the absence of any regu-
lation whatever by the State of Colorado."'s Each city in the state was
able to make its own economic choices in local matters such as the regula-
tion of cable television.52 It would, therefore, be difficult to accept that
the state legislature had contemplated the various actions a municipality
might take in response to this freedom, including anticompetitive actions.
Accordingly, a policy of state neutrality was not sufficient, and Parker
could not be a bar to injunctive relief in the face of home rule legisla-
tion.53 Left open was the question of whether local regulation would
have received Parker immunity had the Colorado legislature expressed an
expectation that municipalities would displace competition in cable tele-
vision markets, but had not imposed state regulation.
The next major case for the Supreme Court, Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire,54 moved away from Lafayette, as the political sands shifted.
The city of Eau Claire was the sole provider of sewage treatment in two
counties. The plaintiff township alleged that the city tied the collection
and transportation of waste services, a market that might have been com-
petitive, to their non-competitive sewage treatment services. The plaintiff
further alleged that the town refused to supply service to surrounding
towns while simultaneously providing service to individuals within those
towns. Purportedly applying the Lafayette and Boulder standards, the
Court examined whether there existed a clearly expressed state policy to
replace competition with regulation. 55 However, the new nuance here,
previously left unanswered by the Court, was how clearly the policy to
displace competition must be expressed, and whether an alternative state
49. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). There, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
federal law which granted jurisdiction to state courts over the acts of certain crimes com-
mitted on reservations by American Indians. Without congressional action, the States are
powerless to exercise political authority over Indians. The Indian Appropriation Act of
1885 addressed therein was a valid exercise of U.S. power in giving state courts jurisdiction
over such matters.
50. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53-54.
51. Id at 55 (citing 630 F.2d 704, 707 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)).
52. The Court recognized that cable television has been characterized as a proper sub-
ject under the Interstate Commerce Clause, thus making the issue a federal concern. Id. at
53 n.16, relying upon United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968).
However, the Court also acknowledged that Colorado believed the regulation of the cable
television industry to be a local concern within the Colorado Home Rule Amendment and,
therefore, not a state matter. Id. at 53 n.16.
53. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55-56.
54. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
55. Id. at 38-44.
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regulatory apparatus must exist. The Court answered that foreseeability
of the challenged conduct by the state is sufficient to displace antitrust
policy, even where the practical result is "sovereign" city states unregu-
lated by the state.56 Surprisingly, the Court relied upon Lafayette,57 hold-
ing that the defendant satisfied the clearly expressed state policy test
although the Lafayette Court had remanded for a factual determination
as to whether such a test was met.58 Moreover, the Lafayette Court ob-
served that mere authorization by a state for a municipality to provide a
natural monopoly service was insufficient to allow a state policy to dis-
place competition. The Court held that Wisconsin had clearly expressed
a policy to displace competition, and that the granting of power to con-
struct and run sewage systems, in addition to allowing the municipality to
decide the area they are to serve, was enough to satisfy the foreseeability
screen.
59
The Hallie Court proceeded under a fundamental assumption that was
quite different from that assumed in Lafayette. Hallie presumes munici-
palities necessarily act in the public interest and not to promote private
monopoly.60 As addressed above, Lafayette understood that municipali-
ties, although acting consistent with certain conceptions of public interest,
e.g. those premised upon command economy ideals, are not necessarily
more likely to comport with national economic policy than are private
enterprises. 61 The presumption in Hallie is used to reject any require-
ment for a showing that the state compelled the municipality to partake
in anticompetitive acts.62 Compulsion, according to Hallie, is a sufficient,
but unnecessary, showing of state policy. An indirect result of Hallie's
reliance upon federalism values to exclude the values of national uni-
formity in regulation and free markets for proprietary municipal conduct
is the Court's acceptance of the premise that localized state economies-
by definition, socialized economies-may be consistent with the "public"
interest, even without state control.
Furthermore, Hallie extends this rationale to determine that municipal-
ities are not subject to the second Midcal prong-active state supervi-
56. lId at 42.
57. In Lafayette the state statutes had similarly authorized municipalities to provide
electric power and to determine the areas to be served.
58. The question before the Court in Lafayette was if the court of appeals erred in
holding further inquiry was necessary to determine if the city's actions were authorized by
the state. The Court found no such error. 435 U.S. 389 at 413-17.
59. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44. The Court in Hallie did not find that the mere authority to
own and operate a business coupled with a municipality doing so created a regulatory
regime. Although not made explicitly clear in Hallie, these subjects are different questions
that the Court must address.
60. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45. This presumption is rebuttable; it is still unclear, however,
what showing would be necessary to rebut the presumption and whether such a showing
would be sufficient to remove state immunity from municipalities.
61. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403.
62. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45-46. Compulsion was a point raised in Cantor and Goldfarb;
both cases covered actions against private parties claiming the state action exemption, on
which point the Court in part distinguished them from actions against a municipality in
Halie. Id. at 45.
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sion-a question previously left open by the Court. Directly contrary to
the Lafayette Court's governing premise, the Hallie Court held that un-
like private parties, a municipality carries "little or no danger that it is
involved in a private price-fixing arrangement. '63 The Court believed the
only real danger might be that municipalities act in a parochial nature to
the detriment of state goals; however, where a contemplated state policy
to allow municipalities to act anticompetitively exists, according to the
Court, no such conflict between state and municipal goals is likely.64
The most recent Supreme Court decision to address the issue of munic-
ipal antitrust immunity is City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertis-
ing.65 Omni had begun to provide billboard space in Columbia, a city
where Columbia Outdoor Advertising (COA) held ninety-five percent of
the billboard market. In response to Omni's market entrance, COA per-
suaded city officials to enact zoning ordinances to restrict billboard con-
struction in the city. The government complied; the resulting zoning laws
were highly favorable to COA, allowing it to maintain dominance of the
billboard market.
The Court relied upon the fact that the city had express statutory au-
thority from the state to regulate the use of land and the construction of
buildings and other structures within its boundaries. Omni argued that
the municipal action was beyond the city's authority, because the actions
at issue did not promote the health, safety, moral, or general welfare if its
citizens. The Court held, however, that narrowing the concept of state
"authority" in such a way would involve federal courts in the construction
of state law in an intrusive fashion, thereby undermining the concept of
federalism. 66 Omni's claim would be more appropriately addressed in a
state court forum challenging whether the municipality was acting appro-
priately under state law, but federal courts applying Parker to federal an-
titrust challenges against local governments should only consider whether
the municipality is acting under a power facially granted to it by the state.
When such a grant is evident on the face of a state statute, the federal
antitrust courts should go no further in the application of federal antitrust
policy. The Court implied that such a narrowly circumscribed review of
state policy was appropriate even where the activities of the municipal
defendant might, upon further analysis, actually conflict with state policy.
The "authority" the Court addressed in Omni was the authority to reg-
ulate. The Court also noted that the antitrust court must address as a
separate matter, whether the municipality had the authority, to suppress
63. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47 (emphasis omitted). This move away from Lafayette is ques-
tionable because it is based upon a presumption which is not necessarily true. Municipali-
ties are just as capable as private actors of violating antitrust and free market policy. See
Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941).
64. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47.
65. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
66. Id at 371-72.
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competition. 67 Such authority, according to the Court, following Hallie, is
dependent upon a "'clear articulation of a state policy to authorize an-
ticompetitive conduct' by the municipality in connection with its regula-
tion."'68 Since the very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace
business freedom, the Court concluded this test was easily met.69 In
dicta, however, the Court indicated that its holding was limited to munici-
pal regulatory activity that necessarily displaced competition. Thus, there
may be a "market participant" exception to municipal immunity under
the state action doctrine, an issue which to date the Court has not yet
decided. 70
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE "CLEAR
ARTICULATION" STANDARD
A so-called "market participant" exception to municipal immunity
does appear to follow from the Court's earlier decisions, particularly La-
fayette, as discussed above. 71 Since Lafayette, the Court has required that
there be a clearly articulated "state policy to displace competition with
67. This analysis on its face seems odd because, by definition, the authority to regulate
appears to encompass the authority to suppress competition. Although the Sherman Act is
a form of regulation it is designed to spur competition, not suppress it. In essence, the Act
protects the free market system from certain flaws that inherently exist. See, e.g., John
Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 481,491-95 (1982) (stating that market failures include natural monopolies, externali-
ties, and public good and free rider problems). See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1988).
68. 499 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 373.
70. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) the govern-
mental/proprietary distinction was rejected as a form of analysis for Interstate Commerce
Clause cases. Many commentators agree that the governmental/proprietary distinction
should play no role in antitrust either. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust
Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 668,730 (1991) (the application of antitrust laws to municipali-
ties should be based upon whether the body politic has a collective financial interest; since
the financial profits gained from a business do not necessarily result in a collective financial
interest for the local residents and government together, a proprietary/governmental di-
chotomy does not reach the proper result); John E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal
Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 78 (1984) (courts
should not use a governmental/proprietary distinction because it focuses on an irrelevant
economic detail; it fails to see that both governmental and proprietary conduct can have
the same effect on consumer welfare). Cf Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 347 (1986) (all acts of the
government, whether "governmental" or "proprietary," should be exempt from antitrust
due to the original intent of the legislature). But see Kenneth J. King, Note, The Preemp-
tion Alternative to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 145, 146-47, 167
(1982) (the Eleventh Amendment protects state independence, but a municipality is only
the state's alter ego when it is performing a state function; therefore, when a municipality,
under a Commerce Clause analysis, is performing a proprietary act instead, it should be
subject to federal antitrust laws). However, as discussed infra notes 112-18 and accompa-
nying text, this distinction is very different from the market participant exception. As
noted above, the Court has accepted a market participant analysis for interstate commerce
cases. For an additional explanation of the role and scope of the market participant excep-
tion in the Commerce Clause context, see Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Partici-
pant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989).
71. See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
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regulation or monopoly public service." z72 Understandably, if the state
has authorized a municipality to regulate an area of business, then an
inference that the state contemplated the displacement of, or an alternate
to, competitive markets, is more logical, as in Omni. On the other hand,
if the state has authorized local government to participate in the respec-
tive market, then such a market participant could be deemed to be acting
in a competitive capacity and therefore be subject to state and federal
guidelines, including federal antitrust law. In other words, state authori-
zation to regulate is more logically associated with the policy to displace
competition than is state authorization to participate in and control the
market or displace competitive forces.
However, lower courts have not taken a unified stance on how to treat
municipal business when no public monopoly has been clearly authorized
by the state. In fact, it appears the circuits have split into at least two
interpretive camps. The first camp focuses primarily upon the Lafayette
language inquiring whether the legislature contemplated the type of an-
ticompetitive activity in dispute.73 In general, such an analysis frequently
leads courts to conclude that state action immunity exists, particularly
when the municipal activity is the sale of natural monopoly services nor-
mally associated with regulated utilities and limited entry. In such cases
federal courts read a state intention to authorize public monopoly from
the mere authorization granted to local government to provide the ser-
vice in question.74 The second camp places more weight on the Lafayette
language requiring evidence of the state policy literally to displace com-
petition with regulation or public monopoly.75 This analysis tends to pre-
clude a finding of immunity for municipalities where the state has not
acted further to regulate the non-competitive markets resulting from mu-
nicipal conduct.
One of the earlier decisions in the first camp, coming on the heals of
Hallie, was Grason Electric Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District.76
In Grason the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) was, de
facto, the sole provider of electricity in Sacramento. Grason Electric al-
leged that SMUD used its monopoly power to leverage into the electrical
distribution systems market and the outdoor lighting systems market, the
two markets in which Grason Electric competed with SMUD. The Ninth
Circuit compared the state statutory grant of authority at issue with the
grant of authority in Hallie. Because of their alleged similarities, and be-
cause the Court in Hallie had found a sufficiently clear articulation of
state policy to grant immunity, SMUD was also given immunity. 77 In es-
sence, the court reasoned that a state legislative grant to operate a "natu-
72. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978). Ac-
cord Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985).
73. See infra notes 76-84.
74. See infra notes 78-83.
75. See infra notes 85-93.
76. 770 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986).
77. Id. at 838.
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ral monopoly" service normally associated with public utility regulation
was evidence that the state contemplated a non-competitive market.
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its analytic approach. Other circuits
adopting this logic, finding state contemplation of non-competitive mar-
kets from legislative authorization to provide public utility service, in-
clude the First, 78 Fourth,79 Sixth,80 Eighth,81 Tenth,82 and the Eleventh
Circuits.8 3 The Eighth Circuit has expressly announced it will continue to
follow a functionally similar, so-called "necessary and reasonable" rule
until such time as the Supreme Court decides formally whether to adopt
the market participation exception.84 Thus, anticompetitive conduct by
municipalities that is necessary and reasonable to support a state-author-
ized natural monopoly business will be deemed antitrust immune.
Other circuits have taken another route, however, particularly when
the municipal business is not a traditional natural monopoly. One Ninth
Circuit case which focuses upon the issue is Lancaster Community Hospi-
tal v. Antelope Valley Hospital District.8 5 Antelope Valley is a public hos-
pital that is the sole provider of perinatal care in the Lancaster area.
Lancaster Community Hospital (LCH) alleged that Antelope Valley was
pressuring insurance companies to send a percentage of their in-patient
work to it or else the hospital would make it difficult for the insurance
company's customers to receive perinatal care-a version of a monopoly
78. Fisichelli v. City Known as Town of Methuen, 956 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1992) (denying
issuance of municipal bonds, even though due in part to the self-interest of a council mem-
ber, is a foreseeable result of the grant of authority to issue bonds). See also Tri-State
Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 998 F.2d 1073 (1st Cir. 1993).
79. Cohn v. Bond, 953 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that statutes authorizing mu-
nicipalities to construct, operate, and maintain hospitals generally contemplate the possible
anticompetitive effect of denial of medical privileges to doctors), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
3057 (1992); Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric Assocs. v. Onslow Memorial Hosp., 795 F.2d 340
(4th Cir. 1986) (denying privileges to association for use of the only C.A.T. scan in the
county is a foreseeable result of enabling legislation allowing municipality to determine
what physicians may practice locally).
80. Consolidated Television Cable Serv., Inc. v. City of Frankfort, 857 F.2d 354 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a cable company who provides service to part of the city was not
allowed to expand to areas that were now serviced by a new municipal cable company
because the enabling legislation was similar to those granted in Hallie), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1082 (1989).
81. Paragould Cablevision v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 963 (1991). But cf Laidlow Waste Sys. v. City of Fort Smith, 742 F. Supp. 540
(W.D. Ark. 1990).
82. Allright Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.) (holding a
municipality is shielded from antitrust laws where it enters the private shuttle business in
direct competition with private companies and passes regulations severely limiting the abil-
ity of the private companies to compete since the enabling legislation is similar to that in
Hallie), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 983 (1991). See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text for
a further discussion of this case and its impact.
83. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 980 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1993) (denying staff
privileges at a municipal hospital is foreseeable and therefore clearly authorized conduct).
See also McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that a state
grant allowing a municipality to own and operate waterworks is comparable to the facts in
Hallie and therefore constitutes a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition).
84. Paragould, 930 F.2d at 1312-13.
85. 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992). The Ninth Circuit
makes the distinction between natural monopolies and other businesses.
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leveraging claim. The court employed a two-step process to analyze
whether the state action doctrine applies to municipal entities. First, the
court addressed whether the municipality has been authorized by the
state to act as challenged. 86 Second, the court addressed whether it is
state policy is to displace competition with regulation or public
monopoly.87
Antelope Valley clearly had the authority to engage in the challenged
business activities, as evidenced by statutes similar to those seen in other
cases.8 8 However, with respect to the second inquiry, the court noted
that the state legislature did not grant municipalities the power to regu-
late or exclude competition in the relevant health care markets. 89 Ante-
lope Valley was merely authorized to provide a service to the community.
The court observed that the likely intent of the state was to spur competi-
tion and not to displace it, and that state authorization of municipal entry
into the hospital market was not a clear articulation of a policy to monop-
olize that market.90 A similar analysis has been applied by other cir-
cuits,91 was recognized by a dissent in the Eleventh Circuit,92 and was
carried out by the Eighth Circuit prior to Paragould.93 As a matter of
Parker/Town of Hallie interpretation, therefore, the circuits are divided
with respect to how clearly and specifically states must articulate a policy
to displace competition.
V. COMMENTATORS AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY DEBATE
The line of cases emanating from Parker have rested firmly on the
Tenth Amendment principle that Congress did not intend for the Sher-
man Act to apply to the actions of a state as sovereign. 94 This body of
law, of course, derives from broader-based federalism concerns. Some
courts have recognized that the applicability of state immunity to local
government-owned businesses is not free from doubt, either as a matter
86. Id. at 400 n.4. This step is the focus of the lower courts discussed infra note 113-18
and accompanying text.
87. This language reflects that of the Lafayette Court, which describes a clearly articu-
lated "state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly." 435 U.S. at 413.
These two aspects of the state grant of authority also parallel Hallie.
88. Similar statutes were found in Hallie and McCallum.
89. Lancaster, 940 F.2d at 402.
90. Id. at 403.
91. Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.) (holding municipal law
prohibiting rental companies from basing rental fees and decisions on customer residence
is not based upon a specific state grant of regulatory powers over the rental industry and is
therefore not immune from antitrust attack), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1054 (1994);
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding market partici-
pants are not immune from federal antitrust laws, but trademark subject matter is im-
mune), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994).
92. Bolt, 980 F.2d at 1381 (holding that must a state policy must be found before dis-
placing competition with regulation).
93. Laidlow Waste, 742 F. Supp. at 540.
94. See, e.g., Yeager's Fuel, supra note 2.
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of statutory construction or constitutional policy.95 Some commentators
believe that the federalism foundation for the state action doctrine is in-
consistent with federal Commerce Clause power and that more appropri-
ate rationales exist for the doctrine. 96 A state or a municipality action
that interferes with the operation of the free market impedes, at least
facially, the congressional choice to commit our economy to the free mar-
ket system.97 Policy differences regarding the applicability of competitive
95. Compare Hertz, supra note 6, with Bolt, supra note 83.
96. See, e.g., Ronald D. Friedmann, Antitrust Ilh The State Action Doctrine, 1985 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 491 (proposing a "rational advancement test" by which the courts make an
unintrusive inquiry into the policies behind the state action and whether the alleged re-
straint on competition rationally advances those policies); Elhauge, supra note 70 (critizing
state action doctrine because it denies preemptive law and because it precludes a princi-
pled coherent resolution; in other words, there is no affirmative theory that supports favor-
ing state interests over federal interests); Cirace, supra note 67 at 487-88 (grounding the
state action doctrine in sovereignty is useless because it does not adequately explain why
municipalities obtain this shield when they are not sovereign but maintaining that munici-
palities should gain some immunity because there are certain market problems that are
best met by attention from the municipalities rather than some higher level of
government).
97. As has been mentioned earlier, the free market system has flaws, and the antitrust
laws were designed to correct these flaws without undermining the essence of our eco-
nomic system. Of course, certain aspects of the law on state immunity have been altered
from that which would normally follow from Parker. An underlying shift in society's views
about regulation may account for the change in approach from Parker to date. Parker
grew out of a time when people were hit hard by the Depression, which was an example to
many that laissez faire does not always work. Accordingly, the Depression was a major
motivating factor behind many of today's programs including the FDIC, social security,
and the nation's current impetus for universal health care. Additionally, World War II
indoctrinated a generation to the idea and benefits, when needed, of price regulation and
rationing. See John S. Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 714-15 (1986); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 10-11 (1965). But see, Matthew L.
Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture
Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1988). As a result, the Parker Court may have been more
open to the need to protect state regulation than the more recent Supreme Court cases
such as Boulder have been in terms of municipal regulation. Historically, antitrust policy
developed as an alternative to laissez faire. The extreme was socialism, which proscribed
the concentration of the means of production as an inevitable consequence of capitalism
and set as an alternative the state ownership of those means. However, the federal govern-
ment was hoping to find a unique, American middle ground between laissez faire and
socialism. See Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust
Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 669-71 (1993). See also William E. Kovacic,
Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool
for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1128-39 (1989) (discussing the debate in the
early 1900s about the proper relationship that government should have with business, par-
ticularly Woodrow Wilson's concern that Roosevelt's good trust/bad trust distinction,
where bad trusts are dissembled and good trusts are overseen and regulated by govern-
ment, would lead to a situation where the trusts would work the relationship to their ad-
vantage and corrupt the political process). Within that continuum, one possibility would
be to selectively socialize natural monopolies. However, as one commentator has pointed
out, America's experiences with such a system to date suggest better than any theoretical
argument that such a system does not eliminate the problems of monopoly, bureaucracy,
inadequate incentives, and political interference. Instead, it is better to accept and mini-
mize the imperfections built into the capitalist/competitive system. 2 ALFRED E. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 328-29 (1988). With the
Sherman Act, Congress decided that America would continue down the path of a free
enterprise system, but recognized that certain imperfections existed and decided the bur-
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rules create the widely recognized tension that exists between the tenets
of federalism and economic uniformity. 98 As John Cirace has noted,
neither federalism nor economic uniformity have been, nor can be, abso-
lute policy guidelines when local practice would displace competition:
"[The] Parker line [does] not encompass all economic regulation and re-
striction of competition by states and their subdivisions. Rather, the
Parker line acknowledges exemption from Sherman Act restrictions only
for certain activities by the state government, such as regulation designed
to 'displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.' "99
With the premise that this tension exists, the question becomes whether
the lower courts have properly applied the state action doctrine in cases
where a municipal government has entered an industry, pursuant to the
authority granted it by the state, and where that industry is neither regu-
lated by the state nor any other body delegated by the state to regulate
such industry.
Perhaps the most appropriate starting point for analyzing the answer,
now that damages immunity is in place and the issue has been somewhat
de-politicized, is the Court's focus in Lafayette; it may then be determined
whether the Lafayette principles are still followed by the Court and are, in
hindsight, sound. Lafayette recognized that municipal governments are
not per se immune from federal antitrust law under the Tenth Amend-
ment. 100 The Court observed that not only is such a reading in compli-
ance with Parker,10 but also deciding otherwise would create "a serious
chink in the armor of antitrust protection."'' 0 2 Whether or not this con-
den of correcting these imperfections rested with the government. Others have expanded
on this theme and have gone so far as to say the burden rests with the lowest level of
government that can approach the problem without a self-interest.
98. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and
Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 719-22 (1985) (arguing that at its extremes
antitrust could be used to forbid all state and local regulation, and that it has been the role
of the state action doctrine to reach some middle ground between the federal preference
for unrestrained markets and the state and local preference to manage their own econo-
mies); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Polit-
ical Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 507 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court cases along the
Parker line are all attempts to compromise between the interests that both the federal and
state governments have in their respective economies); James R. Ratner, Using Currie's
Interest Analysis to Resolve Conflicts Between State Regulation and the Sherman Act, 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 705 (1989) (urging that an interest analysis should be used to best
identify and address the issues as to the conflict between federal and state interests in
economic regulation). Elhauge does not believe this paradigm is necessarily useful.
Neither camp, federalism nor economic uniformity, offers grounds for distinguishing be-
tween the regulatory restraints of the state and the similar restraints of a local government
nor for distinguishing the instances where the state does and does not supervise the re-
straints imposed. Elhauge, supra note 70, at 675.
99. Cirace, supra note 67, at 482 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413).
100. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 (1978). Sev-
eral commentators, relying on congressional intent in the 1890s, have nevertheless ex-
pressed their view that the Sherman Act in no way should be applied to the acts of
governments, state or local.
101. Id at 411-12.
102. Id. at 408.
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clusion rests in part on sovereignty, 10 3 the underlying economic principles
are still sound. Congress made the choice in enacting the Sherman Act
and related laws' * that America's overriding economic regulatory system
is free market capitalism, subject to necessary antitrust policing.'05 That
Congress has done little during the past fifty years' °6 to modify Parker's
conclusion that both municipal and state action 10 7 are subject to, or pre-
empted by, federal antitrust law strongly suggests that the courts have
correctly decided when government intervention in the market must give
way to this fundamental economic choice.' 08 The state's role as regula-
tor, with such experimentation as state sovereign policy authorizes, is the
court's only per se exception to this analysis.1°9
103. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
104. Federal Trade Commisssion Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
105. "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms." United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). This
language has been relied upon by various other Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Lafayette,
435 U.S. at 398 n.16; Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n.19
(1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 485 U.S. 97, 110-
11 (1980).
106. See supra notes 2-3.
107. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
Here, the state entered the marketplace to buy and sell pharmaceuticals. The Court held
the state liable under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a) (1988), be-
cause the state, in essence, chose to shed its sovereignty and enter the private retail market.
Jefferson County, 460 U.S. at 170. The Court clearly distinguished between state purchases
for use in traditional government functions and state purchases for the purpose of compet-
ing against private enterprise in the retail market. Id. at 153-54. The fact that the activity
of a state, as opposed to "state action," can be actionable under federal antitrust laws can
only be reconciled with Parker if one notes the distinction between action in a competitive
market and action to regulate a market.
108. Although Congress recently removed antitrust damage liability from the shoulders
of local governments, anticompetitive activity is still subject to other remedies such as in-
junctions and attorney fees. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 35-36 (1988).
109. Parker clearly stated that the states could regulate and be free from federal anti-
trust laws. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). Certain acts by the state that are not
regulatory in nature, however, are not necessarily exempt. See supra note 91. In essence,
the Court has created a per se immunity for states that act within their regulatory powers.
See Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential
Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 228 (1987) (arguing that the courts, in compli-
ance with the idea of economic federalism, have struggled with the distinction between
state activity and private activity to the point where, today, states are now relatively free to
regulate their economies without fear of federal antitrust prosecution). This regulatory
exemption only applies, however, if the "exemption [is] necessary in order to make the
regulatory act work .... " Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976) (holding
that a free light bulb program initiated by a monopoly electric company is not protected
from the federal antitrust laws merely because the state has approved the usage of such
marketing techniques, since the light bulb market itself is not regulated and gives an unfair
competitive edge to the defendant). Note, however, that the sovereignty-regulatory notion
Parker seems to be founded upon is in part the problem that has hounded the courts when
it comes to addressing municipal immunity because municipalities are not sovereign. See
supra note 48. One suggestion has been to do away with the sovereignty analysis and
address the question on preemption grounds. Cirace, supra note 67, at 486-88 (stating that
there are certain market failures that require municipal attention and are best handled by
municipalities; preemption would allow the courts to address whether municipalities are
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With the advent of Hallie, many commentators and lower federal
courts marked the extension of municipal immunity for the municipality's
anticompetitive activities. 110 However, Hallie did not facially overrule
Lafayette's analytical starting point that municipalities are not protected
by the Tenth Amendment. The Court affirmed that a municipality will
not be immune from antitrust litigation if it is not acting pursuant to a
grant of authority from the state."'
Preserving the power of the federal government to control the an-
ticompetitive acts, particularly proprietary acts, of a municipal entity does
make sense. The Constitution, of course, only provides political power to
the federal government and the states. 1 2 Before a subdivision of the
actually meeting these market failures or otherwise acting in a way in which federal anti-
trust laws should apply). Nevertheless, the ability of the state to regulate is highly valued in
our economic system. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978)
(holding anticompetitive effects of a statute cannot be grounds for invalidation because
that would destroy the state power to regulate). Natural monopolies, externalities, and the
free rider problem plague the openly competitive market. Cirace, supra note 67, at 491.
Concentration of economic power, the spark that ignited the antitrust movement to begin
with, occasionally places people in a situation where competitive forces are no longer
working. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Thus, the role of gov-
ernment is not one of complete laissez faire nor of complete control but of correcting the
problems the free-market system inherently contains. See 1 KAHN, supra note 97, at 2
(stating that as opposed to public utilities, the role of government in the private economic
sector is generally that "of enforcing, supplementing, and removing the imperfections of
competition-not supplanting it"). The importance of regulatory powers and the ability to
correct market failures is so strong that it applies to actions by municipalities even where
such action is done under questionable circumstances. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991) (holding that municipalities are not
liable under antitrust laws for zoning, a form of regulation, even when the decision to zone
may have been due to a conspiracy between the government and a private party with an
economic interest in the subject matter).
110. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Polit-
ical Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987). Some, like Garland, see this municipal immunity
rightly founded in the judiciary's deference to those outcomes that result from the political
process. In essence, if the result came from an elected body, then such results should be
free from federal antitrust review. Id. at 487. This view of what the Court is doing derives
from Hallie's presumption that municipalities are not likely to act in a harmful manner vis-
A-vis their constituents. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text. However, it should
be clear that although municipalities may be acting in their own interests and the interests
of their constituents, the effects of what they do can easily extend beyond their municipal
borders. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403-08 (stating that municipalities are very capable, like
any private party, of acting in a manner contrary to antitrust laws, but if municipalities
were immune from antitrust, they would be capable of impacting the economies beyond
their borders and distorting allocative efficiencies, both at the regional and national levels);
Elhauge, supra note 70, at 732 (arguing that the dormant commerce clause does not apply
where the municipality affects those outside its borders but within the state, thus federal
antitrust laws should apply and municipalities should have less immunity from antitrust
then states). Another reason municipal immunity has been upheld is due to a welfare
exemption to antitrust. This claim of immunity, however, seems limited to municipal ac-
tion in a regulatory sense. See, e.g., Matt Farmer & Kathy Gaertner, Comment, Municipal
Immunity from Antitrust Liability: Recognition of a Broad Welfare Exemption, 1 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 191 (1987).
111. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10 (listing the powers prohibited for the states to exercise); U.S. CONsT. amend. X (stat-
ing "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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state, frequently constituted as a public corporation, can act, it must be
granted authority by the state.113 Therefore, the parameters of municipal
action are defined by the state. Action taken by the municipality outside
its grant of authority is not a proper exercise of municipal power under
state law and, notwithstanding Omni, based upon Tenth Amendment lim-
itations in the reach of federal antitrust law. As in Omni, municipal ac-
tion may improperly extend beyond the power granted by the state with
anticompetitive effects. If municipalities were not subject to federal anti-
trust law for such conduct, there would be anticompetitive activity
throughout the United States that would not be subject to national legis-
lation,114 and inconsistent with sovereign state policy including state limi-
tations upon municipal conduct. Furthermore, to allow municipalities
complete immunity from federal antitrust laws merely because of their
status as a government entity would provide municipalities with greater
protection from federal antitrust law than states themselves are accorded.
The Court in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories"15 held that state purchasers are subject to Robinson-Pat-
man restrictions so long as the state has chosen to compete in the private
retail market. 116 If one suggests, as do some commentators weighing the
federalism/local experimentation side of the balance more heavily, that
most municipal activity should be immune from antitrust law, 1 7 then all
113. See South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 504
(6th Cir. 1986).
114. See Elhauge, supra note 70 for an explanation of how this can occur. Elhauge
begins with the premise that antitrust laws are, in part, premised upon the idea that those
who stand to profit from restraints cannot be trusted to determine which restraints are in
the public interest and which are not. There will be times when a restraint affects those to
whom the acting governmental body is not accountable, giving the representatives a finan-
cial interest in the restraint. Where the benefits of the restraint gained from outsiders
outweigh the burdens, if any, to insiders due to the same restraints, the community has a
collective financial interest in the restraints being imposed. See McCallum v. City of Ath-
ens, 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992) (illustrating one way these financial benefits can be
extracted). States, which are immune from antitrust, can still be attacked under other pro-
visions of the law, such as the Commerce Clause. However, if the action extends beyond
the municipal borders but not beyond the state, the Commerce Clause cannot reach this
breach. Therefore, this action which is contrary to the economic interests of the nation
goes unpoliced if the antitrust laws cannot reach it. Elhauge, supra note 70, at 672, 729-32.
Following up on the deference to political action suggested by Garland, supra note 110,
at 486, a municipal government would not take an action that would restrain its residents
more than outsiders. Therefore, it only makes sense that restraints imposed on insiders
would be instituted only if a great benefit from outsiders can be obtained. Elhauge, supra
note 70, at 737. Therefore, the proposal that courts should uphold choices made by polit-
ical bodies leads to the outcome of the courts upholding the use of market power by mu-
nicipalities against others, even where not explicitly authorized by the state. See, e.g.,
Allright Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
983 (1991), infra notes 138-42 notes and accompanying text. An ill-enlightened deference
leads to an absurd result. It would be better for the courts to address the action being
taken and not to focus so hard on who is acting.
115. 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
116. Id. at 154.
117. Several commentators say it should be so. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 70, at 347
(asserting that the meaning of the Sherman Act should be derived solely from its tradi-
tional sources, which show the Act was meant only to apply to business actors such as the
trusts; since municipalities are not private actors, they should be completely immune);
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state action, contrary to Jefferson County, must also be immune. Such a
position elevates local economic power over the federal choice to pro-
mote allocative efficiency through a competitive process.118
Assume for the moment that state immunity from antitrust is derived
from state sovereignty theory. It does not necessarily follow that such
sovereignty inexorably leads to immunity from antitrust. Some commen-
tators would allow such immunity because there are other laws that the
federal government can use to police the activities of the states, such as
the Commerce Clause.'1 9 This viewpoint, however, seems to disregard
the fact that federal antitrust laws are themselves based on the congres-
sional power over interstate commerce. 120 Since antitrust law is an appli-
cation of the Commerce Clause, the fact that some other aspect of federal
power derived from the Commerce Clause can also be used to deter an
activity is no basis upon which to deny the application of antitrust laws.
The focus should be on applying a law, essentially unchanged by Con-
gress during the past 100 years, that has goals applicable to the actions at
issue and not upon whether some other body of law also applies. It is not
uncommon for different bodies of law to be applicable to the same situa-
tion but result in different outcomes.12'
In addition, local governmental entities engaged as market participants
should be open to antitrust attack on a more fundamental level.
Whatever goal one wishes to ascribe to antitrust, 22 there will be times
Lopatka, supra note 70, at 25 (arguing that only a fraction of municipal activity conflicts
with federal goals; the costs of policing such activity is prohibitive, and therefore antitrust
review should be abandoned, providing municipalities with absolute immunity from fed-
eral antitrust laws).
Arthur seems to ignore the fact that municipalities can and do enter into the business
arena, thereby becoming business actors. If municipalities act and compete with private
business, they should be subject to the same laws. McCallum and Allright Colorado are
examples of cases in which municipalities entered the competitive marketplace but were
not held to the conditions required by antitrust laws. In Jefferson County and Union Pa-
cific, the state and municipality, respectively, were held accountable.
118. There are others who agree. For instance, Elhauge recognizes there are times
when, if antitrust did not intervene, the action would go without review. Elhauge, supra
note 70.
119. See, e.g., Richard M. Steuer, Coming Full Circle on State Action, 7 CARDOZO L.
REV. 439, 447-48 (1986) (municipalities will be largely free from antitrust laws, but the
federal government can still challenge certain activities under the Civil Rights Act, the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment, and the Interstate Commerce
Clause); Lopatka, supra note 70, at 70 (Interstate Commerce Clause can be used instead of
antitrust laws if a municipality's actions affect those outside of the state). Cf. Stephanie
Ames, Note, City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.: The Expansion of Stale
Action Immunity to Municipal Regulation, 18 J. CoNTEMP. L. 309 (1992) (Interstate Com-
merce Clause, first amendment rights, and due process violations can be used to preempt
local regulations; however, this is not the proper subject for antitrust law).
120. Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1006 (5th
Cir. 1979).
121. Compare, e.g., Commerce and Due Process Clause applications with state regula-
tion of a corporate takeover, Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
122. Chicago theorists propose antitrust has but one goal: the maximization of con-
sumer welfare. See Lopatka, supra note 70, at 54 (maximization of consumer welfare is
synonymous with allocative efficiency). However, others believe the courts have upheld or
1995] 1805
SMU LAW REVIEW
when the action of a state or municipality will conflict with and under-
mine antitrust law,'2 3 resulting in a move to preempt this state or local
activity by antitrust law. a24
The Court after Lafayette simply has not addressed the core choice in-
volved in municipal immunity cases among alternative forms of regula-
tion: free market, public utility, or command economy (municipal
services). In Lafayette the Court held that for a municipality to be
granted immunity, a state policy to replace competition with regulation
must exist. 125 Other Supreme Court decisions have also contained this
requirement as a necessary element of immunity.126 Several commenta-
tors, however, conclude that Hallie gave municipalities practical immu-
nity from federal antitrust laws, 127 by virtue of the inherent, underlying
requirement that the state must authorize any municipal conduct. The
black letter rule from Hallie provides that a municipality is to be afforded
protection under the state action doctrine if the anticompetitive actions
complained of were a foreseeable result of the state's grant of authority
to act.128 Beyond that holding, the Court mentioned in at least three
should uphold other philosophies as well. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 97, at 724, 743 (cap-
ture theory in part demonstrates how the small in number can exploit the majority);
Spitzer, supra note 97, at 1300 (efficiency criteria and other outcome orientated values are
a better guide than producer capture theory); Garland, supra note 98, at 519 (it is not the
role of antitrust to overturn the results of the state political process); Jorde, supra note 109,
at 251-52 (federalism, and thus deference to the state, should be placed above allocative
efficiency); Nolan E. Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization
Standard, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1134 (1985) (the Supreme Court has wisely chosen not
to find any one goal or set of goals, nor has it uniformly adopted the Chicago School
theory, for antitrust law since it has upheld social and political advantages as other benefits
of competition). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANr'TRusT PARADOX (rev. ed.
1993).
123. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417. "[E]ven a lawful monopolist may be subject to antitrust
restraints when it seeks to extend or exploit its monopoly in a manner not contemplated by
its authorization." Id. (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-382
(1973)). This language in Lafayette has not yet been expressly affirmed by a majority of the
Supreme Court, but the Court in Hallie did rely on similar language from Parker: "[Tihe
State may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be
lawful." Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39 (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 351).
124. Several excellent articles state that there are times when municipal and state activ-
ity would otherwise escape federal control when such regulation would be necessary. See,
e.g., Elhauge, supra note 70; Jorde, supra note 109; Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note
98; Cirace, supra note 67.
125. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417. At least one commentator has pointed out that the
anticompetitive activities in Lafayette were not directed towards the correction of a market
failure, imperfection, or instability and therefore properly subject to antitrust laws despite
the fact that the businesses involved there were each a natural monopoly. Cirace, supra
note 67, at 501.
126. See, e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55 (concerned about city action absent any regula-
tion whatsoever); Omni, 499 U.S. at 393 ("Parker defense also requires authority to sup-
press competition"); Jefferson County, 460 U.S. at 154 (state purchasers acting in the
competitive market are subject to Robinson-Patman claims). Cf Fisher v. Berkeley, 475
U.S. 260 (1986); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48 (1985); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (no express
intent to displace the antitrust laws, but the state statute provides a regulatory structure
that inherently displaces "unfettered business freedom").
127. See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 98; Cirace, supra note 67.
128. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42.
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places the need for a state policy to displace competition with regula-
tion.129 This language created the continuing ambiguity that is the focus
of this article.
Assuming, arguendo, that Hallie did make it necessary for the courts to
address whether the state intended to displace competition, it appears the
Court is prepared to tone down the results of Hallie. For example, in
Omni, the Court stated: "Besides authority to regulate, however, the
Parker defense also requires authority to suppress competition-more
specifically, 'clear articulation of a state policy to authorize anticompeti-
tive conduct' by the municipality in connection with its regulation."'130
This reading, followed by Ticor, should be recognized as a swing of the
pendulum from increased municipal immunity to a return to addressing
the existence of a regulatory regime; or it may simply be a clarification of
what the Court in Hallie stated in the first place. Either way, the funda-
mental underpinnings of Lafayette remain strong.13'
VI. THE PARADIGMS OF MCCALLUM AND
ALLRIGHT COLORADO
Lower court applications of Supreme Court antitrust decisions can lead
to outcomes quite contrary to such fundamental policy and have become
quite common during the past decade in failing to incorporate the en-
tirety of Supreme Court rationales. In McCallum v. City of Athens132 the
Eleventh Circuit was faced with a situation where the state did not and
could not, pursuant to state constitutional law, regulate certain practices
by water companies. 133 Consumers were serviced by either private or
municipal water companies. State legislation authorized the existence of
privately owned water businesses and thus plainly did not authorize pub-
lic monopoly. Athens operated a for-profit waterworks that supplied
water to between ninety and ninety-five percent of the consumers within
the city limits and a bulk of the surrounding area. Non-residents were
charged roughly two-and-a-quarter times more for water than resi-
dents, 34 several high-volume users within the city limits were billed be-
low marginal cost, 135 and the city entered into several anticompetitive
combinations effectively precluding the growth of competition.
129. Il at 38-39 ("[T]o obtain exemption, municipalities must demonstrate that their
anticompetitive activities were authorized by the State 'pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service.' ") (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
413); Id. at 40 ("[In Boulder... we declined to accept Lafayette's suggestion that a munici-
pality must show more than that a state policy to displace competition exists.") (emphasis
added); Id. at 44 ("In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 'clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed' state policy to displace competition with regulation
in the area of municipal provision of sewage services.") (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415).
130. Omni, 499 U.S. at 372 (citing Hallie, 471 U.S. at 40).
131. See, e.g., supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
132. 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992).
133. See id. 653-55.
134. McCallum, 976 F.2d at 651.
135. This point was not mentioned in the Eleventh Circuit opinion. It is alluded to in
the district court's original decision in Wall v. City of Athens, 663 F. Supp. 747, 750 (M.D.
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The court compared Georgia's statutes authorizing the municipality to
act with Wisconsin's statutes in Hallie and held that the similarities
pointed to reaching the same conclusion as in Hallie, finding immunity
from antitrust. 136 A critical mistake was the court's failure to recognize
that in Wisconsin the municipal sewage companies were operating under
a regulatory regime, whereas in Georgia the municipal water companies
were not regulated and were in direct competition with other for-profit
enterprises, suggesting a basic difference in state economic regulatory
policies. The effects of McCallum are to provide municipal businesses in
the competitive marketplace with a strategic advantage over private com-
panies, which do not have access to the protection of the state action
doctrine, 137 and to legitimize totally unregulated monopolies which abuse
non-resident consumers.
The effect of such legitimized monopoly status given to municipalities
can be very destructive. One additional example of this danger occurred
in Colorado. 138 In 1984, Allright Colorado, Inc. was in the business of
shuttling people to and from outlying parking lots at the Denver airport.
Allright held 62.1% of the market share, and a competitor, which also
became a plaintiff in this case, held 37.4% of the market. When the City
of Denver entered the shuttle service business, it passed laws exempting
the city's business from fees charged to the other businesses; it forced the
private companies to use other, less desirable access routes to the airport
and pick-up locations at the airport; and it gave the city's shuttle service
the exclusive right to advertise at the airport, to use the public right-of-
ways, and to place signs leading travelers to its lots. All of this was done
with no direct authority granted by the state to the cities to operate an
airport shuttle service. 139 Five years later, Allright Colorado, Inc. had a
Ga. 1987), and was more specifically stated in the appellant's brief, at 5-6. Other anticom-
petitive actions were also alleged and more fully addressed in Wall, 663 F. Supp. at 749
(market and customer division, monopoly and attempt to monopolize, and others). This
situation appears to be one in which Elhauge would agree federal antitrust laws should
apply. See Elhauge, supra note 70, at 729-32.
136. McCallum, 976 F.2d at 653-55.
137. Since Georgia does not regulate water companies, there can be no active state
supervision of private activities as required for this protection to take effect. See, e.g.,
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); FTC
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992). Thus, the immunity found for defendant would
not exist for its private competitors if engaging in identical conduct. Since several circuits
refuse to focus on the subject of a regulatory/market participant distinction, this result is
likely to repeat itself until the Supreme Court definitively answers the question. See supra
notes 6-10.
138. Allright Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 983 (1991).
139. The enabling legislation did allow municipalities to own and operate airports and
"to regulate the receipt, deposit, and removal and the embarkation of passengers.., to or
from such airports." Id. at 1508. There is a large difference between the power to regulate
and the power to engage in business. The court ignores a canon of construction for state
enabling legislation. Dillon's Rule says the scope of local power under state enabling legis-
lation should be determined from either (1) the express words of the legislation; (2) those
powers that necessarily or fairly are implied in or incident to those words; or (3) those
powers that are essential to the declared objects and purpose of the legislation. Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: The Structure of Local Government Law (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L.
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24.1% market share; the other private competitor had 18.3% of the mar-
ket; and the municipal shuttle service enjoyed a 45% market share, which
was still growing.
On its face, this seems to be the kind of activity which the antitrust laws
under Lafayette were designed to outlaw. The court of appeals recog-
nized that a municipality must pass a two-step test, according to Hallie, in
order to claim protection under the state action doctrine: (1) The state
legislature must have authorized the action in question; and (2) the state
legislature must have intended to displace competition with regulation. 40
While Colorado intended the cities to regulate shuttle services and au-
thorized such regulation, there was no authorization to enter the shuttle
business. 14' Nevertheless, the court of appeals compared the grants of
authority in Hallie and Allright Colorado and decreed that since the lan-
guage in the two schemes was similar, the outcome must also be similar.
As a result, the city was immune from antitrust attack under federal
law.142
In isolation, monopolized water service in Athens and displaced com-
petition in the airport shuttle market in Denver did not markedly inter-
fere with the national competitive economy. In each case, however,
segments of the public are faced with government control of a market
that reverberates outside the local area to effect suppliers, potential com-
petitors, and consumers in a presumptively inefficient fashion at odds
with national policy. If the lower courts continue to divine state "author-
ity" to monopolize from the scant and arguably non-existent language in
Allright Colorado, then local governments will feel free to enter into
other businesses under the guise of acting for the public good, and control
increasing aspects of our economic lives. For example, if it is important
that our people get the food they need at fair prices, municipal govern-
ment could zone competitors out of business and operate the sole grocery
store in an area; or if municipalities are unhappy with the moral content
being provided through the written medium, municipal governments
could own their own bookstores and effectively declare illegal all others.
Why regulate when majoritarian local government can be the sole pro-
vider, unsupervised by the state?
VII. CONCLUSION
The lower federal courts increasingly in the wake of Hallie and Omni
Outdoor Advertising have concluded that anticompetitive municipal con-
duct is immune from federal antitrust challenge because the respective
state legislatures necessarily contemplated that the municipal defendant
REV. 1, 8 (1990). It is clear that the express words of the Colorado legislation, unlike the
statutes in Hallie, did not authorize the municipalities to operate a shuttle service. One
would be hard pressed to argue it is necessary, incident to, or essential to operate a busi-
ness if one has be authorized merely to regulate that business.
140. Id at 1506.
141. See supra note 139 (discussing legislative authorization).
142. Allright Colo., 937 F.2d at 1509.
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would engage in the challenged conduct. Such a finding of state contem-
plation or foreseeability often is based upon the state's general grant of
authority to the municipality required, under state law, to empower the
municipality to act. When the challenged municipal conduct is regula-
tory, such as the zoning regulation challenged in Omni, the resulting im-
munity may be legitimate and defensible because of the natural
repugnancy between some forms of regulation, on one hand, and an un-
regulated free market on the other. Moreover, Tenth Amendment feder-
alism concerns appropriately support state delegation of its regulatory
authority to local government to promote the kinds of economic experi-
mentation and self-government that commentators cite in support of an
extension of the Parker doctrine to municipalities.
When local government enters the marketplace as a market partici-
pant, however, and competes in the context of provider-consumer trans-
actions, as opposed to providing tax-supported community services
without a provider-consumer market, the municipal business, acting with
antitrust immunity, poses a significant threat to free markets warned
about in Lafayette, which is inconsistent with national economic policy
and goals. The promotion of pockets of unregulated city-states, operating
as command economies, can only be seen as ironic in the last decade of
the twentieth century when socialism has failed elsewhere in the world.
In such municipal market participant situations, the respective states
should be required to involve themselves more directly in the displace-
ment of competition for their local governments to properly invoke
Parker immunity. The "active state supervision" prong of the Midcal test
for immunity now required only for private defendants, as in the recent
Ticor decision, should be extended to challenged municipal market par-
ticipant conduct. Only in such a setting, in which sovereign state policy is
expressed unambiguously, including but not necessarily limited to state
public utility regulation, should federalism concerns be allowed to dis-
place federal antitrust policies of the markets and an on-going competi-
tive process.
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